We consider strategic trade among identical countries and compare the impacts of multilateral versus regional tari¤ reduction on equilibrium pollution tax and social welfare. While both forms of trade liberalization increase production and consumption in the tari¤-reducing countries, regional trade liberalization also reduces production in a non-participating country and may decrease its consumption. When pollution is local, regional and multilateral trade liberalization have similar impacts in the tari¤-reducing countries. In contrast, when pollution is perfectly transboundary, regional (multilateral) trade liberalization (i) weakens (may strengthen) environmental protection in the tari¤-reducing countries, and (ii) in the neighbourhood of free trade, may increase (decreases) welfare of the tari¤-reducing countries.
Introduction
Environmentalists have long worried that expanded international trade will detrimentally and sometimes irreparably a¤ect the ecosystem. One concern is that competitive pressures unleashed by trade will force governments to weaken their environmental policies, and may even lead to the emergence of pollution havens. The transboundary nature of many pollutants will also make it unlikely that governments, acting noncooperatively, will pursue globally e¢ cient environmental policies. A growing body of literature in economics has examined these concerns (e.g. Krutilla, 1991; Ulph, 1996; Antweiler, et al., 2001; Greenstone, 2002; McAusland, 2008; Managi, et al. 2009 ).
1 In general, economists have pointed out that the relation between international trade and the environment is a multifaceted one and the impacts can go either way depending on the speci…c context. For example, while the "scale e¤ect" associated with trade liberalization tends to increase pollution, the "technique e¤ect" tends to decrease it. Moreover, the "composition e¤ect"of trade liberalization can increase or decrease pollution in a country depending on its comparative advantage (Copeland and Taylor, 2003) .
In the presence of imperfect competition, countries trading with each other have an incentive to strategically distort their environmental policy in order to increase their welfare in the non-cooperative equilibrium (Barrett, 1994; Kennedy, 1994) . When imperfectly competitive …rms compete in terms of quantities, reducing domestic …rms' environmental costs makes them more competitive internationally, enabling a country to capture additional rents. This tends to ine¢ ciently weaken environmental policy in these countries. At the same time, a desire to shift polluting production from itself to its trading partners can lead each country to make its environmental policy ine¢ ciently stringent. For the case of symmetric countries and transboundary pollution, Kennedy (1994) concludes that the net impact under free trade is a lowering of the pollution tax below its e¢ cient level.
While Kennedy identi…es how the equilibrium pollution tax may be distorted under free trade, Burguet and Sempere (2003) examine how trade liberalization (in the form of bilateral tari¤ reduction) a¤ects environmental policy and welfare by changing the various distortionary forces. Using a model of bilateral trade with imperfect competition and local pollution, the authors show that trade liberalization can make environmental policy more or less stringent, depending on factors such as the convexity of the damage function and the emission intensity of output. On the one hand, by increasing output, trade liberalization increases marginal social cost of output, which tends to tighten environmental policy. On the other hand, lower tari¤s imply lower import revenue, which tends to make environmental policy more lax. The net impact on equilibrium environmental policy depends on the relative strength of these counteracting forces. Further, Burguet and Sempere …nd that when the environmental policy instrument is a pollution tax, marginal social cost is always less than price. Consequently, by increasing output, a bilateral tari¤ reduction always increases welfare of each country. 2 One limitation of the literature on trade liberalization and strategic environmental policy is that it usually considers a two-country framework and examines the symmetric case of trade liberalization by both countries. This is akin to an examination of the impact of multilateral trade liberalization (when there are more than two countries) on the environment. However, much trade liberalization worldwide has involved regional trade agreements, where a sub-group of trading countries decides to gradually reduce tari¤ on each others imports.
3 In fact, while multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the WTO have fumbled in recent years, regional trade agreements (RTAs) have proliferated. 4 When tari¤ reduction takes such a regional form, the impact on strategic environmental policy and welfare in the participating and non-participating countries is likely to be di¤erent from those under multilateral tari¤ reduction. The current paper examines this under-explored issue of the environmental and welfare impacts of RTAs and compares these impacts with those under multilateral trade liberalization.
While there has been a recent move towards incorporating environmental issues in international trade agreements, the coordination of trade and environmental policies 2 In their Proposition (p. 31), Burguet and Sempere (2003) note, "If the environmental instrument is a tax (either on output, input, or emissions), a bilateral reduction in tari¤s increases welfare." 3 For example, under NAFTA, the participating countries (Canada, Mexico and the US) agreed to reduce their tari¤s in equal annual stages over a speci…ed number of years. 4 As the WTO notes, "The surge in RTAs has continued unabated since the early 1990s.
As of 15 May 2011, some 489 RTAs, counting goods and services noti…ca-tions separately, have been noti…ed to the GATT/WTO. At that same date, 297 agreements were in force... The overall number of RTAs in force has been increasingly steadily, a trend likely to be strengthened by the many RTAs currently under negotiations." (see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm). For detailed information on all the RTAs currently in force, see http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx across countries remains largely absent (OECD, 2007) . 5 On the other hand, as international trade agreements have progressively left countries with less ‡exibility to pursue independent tari¤ policies, this has motivated some countries to use environmental (and other domestic) policy instruments in order to achieve trade policy objectives (Ederington and Minier, 2003) . When environmental policy is strategically chosen by countries, our analysis indicates that the impact of freer trade on environmental protection and welfare depends on the nature of the trade liberalization process. The di¤erences in outcomes for multilateral vs. regional trade liberalization exist even when the countries are identical. We …nd that, while multilateral trade liberalization increases production and consumption in the tari¤-reducing countries, regional trade liberalization reduces production in the non-participating country and may decrease its consumption as well. The changes in consumption and production have corresponding impacts on the rent capture and pollution shifting e¤ects in these countries. Further, the tari¤ e¤ect of trade liberalization tends to reduce equilibrium pollution tax in tari¤-reducing countries in the multilateral case, but tends to increase the non-participating country's pollution tax in the case of regional trade liberalization.
The paper shows that multilateral and regional trade liberalization a¤ects pollution tax and welfare in tari¤-reducing countries in similar ways when pollution damage is localized, but in dissimilar ways when pollution is largely transboundary. For global pollutants such as greenhouse gases, we …nd that regional (multilateral) trade liberalization (i) weakens (may strengthen) environmental protection in the tari¤-reducing countries, and (ii) in the neighbourhood of free trade, may increase (decreases) welfare of the tari¤-reducing countries. The asymmetry inherent in regional trade liberalization makes it more likely than multilateral trade liberalization to weaken environmental protection in the tari¤-reducing (but otherwise identical) countries. Furthermore, regional trade liberalization is found to a¤ect pollution tax and welfare in the participating and non-participating countries in dissimilar ways. For instance when pollutants have very harmful but localized impacts, regional trade liberalization strengthens environmental protection in participating countries but weakens such protection in non-participating countries.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the model, where three countries with oligopolistic markets engage in international trade in a polluting good, and derives its equilibrium. In section 3, we analyze the benchmark scenario where the countries undertake multilateral tari¤ reduction. Section 4 then takes up the case of regional trade liberalization where two countries (the "participating countries") engage in bilateral tari¤ reduction while the third country (the "non-participating country") stays out of this process. The results from multilateral and regional trade liberalization are compared in section 5, while the last section concludes.
The model
Consider three identical countries, 1, 2 and 3, with segmented markets. There are n …rms in each country, with n 1. All …rms produce a homogeneous good and face a constant marginal cost of production, given by c: Each …rm in country 1 sells x i units of the good in country i; where i = 1; 2; 3. Each …rm in country 2 sells y i units in country i. Each …rm in country 3 sells z i units of the good in country i.
In each market, …rms compete in quantities, i.e. à la Cournot. Inverse demand in each country is identical and given by
where p (0) c a > 0; and Q i is total quantity sold in country i. Country 1 (respectively, country 2) charges a tari¤ of per unit of import from country 2 (respectively, country 1). Countries 1 and 2, each charges a tari¤ of per unit of import from country 3. Country 3 charges a tari¤ of per unit of import from countries 1 and 2 (see Figure 1) . The tari¤s are given exogenously in our model. Initially, i.e. pre-trade liberalization, the tari¤ rates are the same (i.e. = ) in identical countries.
Trade liberalization takes the form of a reduction in the relevant tari¤ rate. Two alternative forms of trade liberalization are considered. We de…ne "multilateral trade liberalization"as an equal multilateral reduction in the tari¤ rates and by all three countries, and analyze this benchmark scenario in Section 3. The next section considers "regional trade liberalization", de…ned as an equal bilateral reduction in the tari¤ rate by countries 1 and 2 only (with remaining unchanged). This re ‡ects the situation subsequent to the signing of a regional trade agreement amongst a sub-group of the trading partners (countries 1 and 2) while others remain outside the agreement (country 3, in our case). Unlike multilateral trade liberalization, regional trade liberalization introduces an asymmetry among the three ex-ante identical countries.
A by-product of production in this industry is pollution. With appropriate de…ni-tion of units, it is assumed that, for every unit of output produced, the …rms emit one unit of pollution. 6 The pollution is transboundary where 2 [0;
1 3
] fraction of pollution generated in one country a¤ects each of the other two countries. The social cost of pollution is increasing and convex in the level of emissions a¤ecting a country. The pollution damage function in country i; given by D i ; is as follows:
(1)
(2)
where 0 is the pollution damage parameter, and the total production undertaken in countries 1, 2 and 3 are respectively X n
: Di¤erent values of the transboundary pollution or spillover parameter, ; allow us to consider a continuum of cases ranging from strictly local pollution ( = 0) to perfectly transboundary pollution ( =
3
).
7 The environmental policy in country i is a tax imposed on domestic …rms at the rate t i per unit of emission. Given our assumption of constant emission-output ratio, a tax per unit of emission is equivalent to a tax per unit of the polluting good. The sequence of moves is as follows. In the …rst stage, (an environmental authority in) each country chooses its pollution tax to maximize the country's own welfare, taking the other countries'pollution taxes (and the tari¤s, and ) as given. In the second stage, each …rm takes the policies set by the countries and the output decisions of the 6 Thus we are assuming a constant emission intensity of output. Emissions can be reduced through a reduction in output, with foregone pro…t being the abatement cost for a …rm. Allowing …rms to separately choose their level of abatement does not change our results qualitatively.
7 When = 1 3 , pollution generated in each country a¤ects all three countries equally. We are ignoring situations where 2 ( 1 3 ;
1 2 ], i.e. where pollution generated in each country a¤ects that country less than it a¤ects the other countries. In a setting where pollution ‡ows from an upstream to a downstream country, could exceed 1 3 in the upstream (but not the downstream) country. Since we are assuming is identical across the three countries, we restrict its value to the [0;
(3n 1) other …rms as given, and chooses its own output. To obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the model is solved using backward induction.
Second stage: Output decision of …rms
Total quantity sold in country i is given by Q i = n (x i + y i + z i ). The pro…t maximization problems of each …rm in countries 1, 2 and 3 are respectively given by (4) ; (5) and (6):
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities for the three markets are computed. The quantities sold in country 1 and country 2 are:
The quantities sold in country 3 are given by:
We assume that parameter values are such that each of the above quantities is positive. Country 1's total production is X = n (x 1 + x 2 + x 3 ), total consumption is Q 1 = n (x 1 + y 1 + z 1 ), and net import is n (
Similarly, country 3's net import is n (x 3 + y 3 z 1 z 2 ) = n 2t 3 t 1 t 2 + 2n( ) 3n+1 .
First stage: Equilibrium environmental policy
In the …rst stage of the game, each country chooses the pollution tax rate that maximizes its own welfare, taking as given the tari¤ levels and the other countries'pollution taxes. Social welfare is de…ned to be the sum of consumer surplus; producer surplus; tari¤ revenue and pollution tax revenue less pollution damage: Welfare in country i, W i ; is thus given by
In country 1, for example, we have that consumer surplus
; and pollution damage D 1 is as given by (1).
The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium pollution tax in each country is computed by simultaneously solving the three …rst order conditions:
= 0 for i = 1; 2; 3. We denote these equilibrium taxes, which are a function of the tari¤ rates, as t 1 ( ; ) = t 2 ( ; ) and t 3 ( ; ). The second order condition for welfare maximization is satis…ed since we have the following:
= n 2 12n + 5 + 9 ( (6n + 2) 2n 1)
Multilateral trade liberalization
We begin by analyzing the benchmark case of multilateral trade liberalization, where all three countries start from the same initial tari¤ rate (i.e. = ) and undertake an equal marginal reduction in that rate. 8 We analyze the impact of such multilateral tari¤ reduction on the equilibrium pollution tax and welfare in each country. Since tari¤ rates are equal across the countries both before and after trade liberalization, the equilibrium pollution tax rate and welfare levels are also identical in the three countries under this symmetric scenario. By substituting = in t i ( ; ), the equilibrium pollution tax rate in each country is derived as t m i = t m ( ) for i = 1; 2; 3, where t m ( ) 3a (2n + 1) 3 n (3a 2 ) (1 2 + 2n (1 3 )) 2 (3n + 3n 2 + 1) 9n (2 (3n + 1) (1 + ) (2n + 1)) (10) and the superscript 'm'is used to denote this multilateral trade liberalization scenario.
The various sources of distortions that tend to make the equilibrium tax globally ine¢ cient are as follows. First, there is the "transboundary externality e¤ect" that tends to lower t m from its globally e¢ cient level, as each country ignores the impact of pollution generated within its own borders on welfare in the other countries. Second, there is the "rent capture e¤ect"that also tends to lower the equilibrium pollution tax.
Since the imperfectly competitive …rms enjoy rents, each government has a strategic incentive to provide a competitive advantage to its domestic …rms so that they are able to capture more foreign rent. Third, there is a "pollution shifting e¤ect" (or a not-in-my-backyard e¤ect) that tends to increase t m , as each country tries to drive polluting production from itself to the other countries. The transboundary externality e¤ect and the pollution shifting e¤ect depend on the extent to which pollution crosses jurisdictions. As increases from 0 to 1 3 , the former e¤ect becomes stronger while the latter e¤ect becomes weaker. Note that when the good is clean (i.e. = 0), both these e¤ects are non-existent. Moreover, the rent capture e¤ect disappears when the market becomes competitive (i.e. as n ! 1). The equilibrium pollution tax (10) in such a case becomes
As long as there is positive tari¤ (i.e. = > 0), each country enjoys tari¤ revenue on imports and has to pay for exports. This gives them an incentive to substitute foreign production for domestic production, and consequently to tax domestic …rms (the "tari¤ e¤ect" on the equilibrium tax). It is only when there is free trade (i.e. = = 0) as well, that the equilibrium pollution tax rate in each country, (11), becomes zero. In the symmetric equilibrium, substituting t i = t m ( ) in (7) and (8), we have total output produced equal to total output consumed in each country, so that its net import is zero. 9 The total output, produced or consumed, in each country is
Multilateral tari¤ reduction increases output in each country as @Q i @ < 0. Moreover, the prohibitive tari¤ rate, at which imports become zero, is given by 10 m max 3a (2n + 1) 3 n (1 2 + 2n (1 3 )) + 6n 2 + 9n + 2
The impact of multilateral trade liberalization on the above-mentioned e¤ects, and their trade-o¤, determines how the equilibrium pollution tax changes as a result. From (10), we have
From (12), Proposition 1 follows.
Proposition 1: Multilateral tari¤ reduction leads to an increase in the equilibrium pollution tax in each country (i.e. Note that the threshold value of the pollution damage parameter, m A ; itself depends on the extent to which pollution is transboundary. As output increases and price falls with trade liberalization, this increases pollution damage and decreases rents. Consequently, a country's incentive to raise tax to drive out polluting production increases, and its incentive to lower tax to capture additional rents decreases. These exert an upward pressure on the equilibrium pollution tax. However, a lower tari¤ also reduces tari¤ revenues from imports. This reduces the country's incentive to substitute foreign production for domestic production by increasing the tax. As a result, equilibrium pollution tax tends to decrease. The net impact on the tax depends on the relative strength of the two counteracting forces. . Whether tari¤ reduction, by increasing output, increases welfare of a country or not depends on whether initially price exceeds marginal social cost of output in that country. When pollution is cross-boundary, Proposition 2 indicates that welfare is nonmonotonic and concave in . It is only when tari¤ is su¢ ciently high ( > m A ), and the associated output su¢ ciently low, that price exceeds marginal social cost. An increase in output due to multilateral tari¤ reduction then increases welfare. The opposite result holds when < m A . Thus, in the neighbourhood of free trade (when ! 0), multilateral tari¤ reduction decreases welfare in each country as long as > 0.
11
An implication of the non-monotonicity of W m ( ) is that the direction of change in welfare of a country due to marginal multilateral reductions in tari¤ may not be the same as that due to a discrete jump in tari¤ (to free trade, for example). Note that W m ( ) is non-monotonic and concave in even when markets are competitive and rents tend to zero. 12 Existence of the rent capture e¤ect is, therefore, not necessary for Proposition 2 to hold. In contrast, if the good was clean and the transboundary externality and pollution shifting e¤ects were absent, multilateral trade liberalization would always increase welfare. 13 Furthermore, the threshold value of tari¤, m A , is an increasing function of the transboundary pollution parameter . In fact when pollution is purely local (as in Burguet and Sempere, 2003) , trade liberalization always improves welfare as (13) implies
11 We have, lim !0
2 : 13 Again,
Regional trade liberalization
We now move from multilateral trade liberalization, where all countries trading with each other reduce their tari¤ rate, to regional trade liberalization where only a subset of the trading countries reduce their tari¤ rate. Speci…cally, we analyze the impact of an equal bilateral reduction in the tari¤ rate by countries 1 and 2, with remaining unchanged. This could, for instance, happen if countries 1 and 2 sign a trade agreement and decide to gradually move towards a regional free trade area, which does not include country 3. Now we have an asymmetric case where the impact of regional trade liberalization in the participating countries (countries 1 and 2) will di¤er from that in the non-participating country (country 3). The Nash equilibrium pollution taxes in each country, t 1 ( ; ) = t 2 ( ; ) and t 3 ( ; ), are still subject to similar e¤ects as mentioned in Section 3. Although qualitatively similar, the magnitudes of these e¤ects di¤er across the countries when 6 = .
For instance, when = 0 and the transboundary externality and pollution shifting e¤ects are absent, the equilibrium pollution taxes are given by
where A 9a (2n + 1) (3n + 1) and B 36n+78n 2 +54n 3 +5. Moreover, in the limiting case when the number of …rms n ! 1 and the rent capture e¤ect is eliminated as well, the equilibrium pollution taxes due to the tari¤ e¤ect are given by
Lemma 1: A bilateral reduction in tends to reduce equilibrium pollution tax in the participating countries, and increase that in the non-participating country, through the tari¤ e¤ect.
The above lemma follows from (14) and (15). Note that the tari¤ e¤ect on the equilibrium pollution tax in the participating countries is independent of , while that in the non-participating country depends on both and . In particular, the tari¤ e¤ect encourages the non-participating country to subsidize production when its own tari¤ is (close to) zero, as lim n!1 t 3 ( ; ) j =0; =0 = 1 3 < 0.
14 Substituting the Nash equilibrium taxes, t 1 ( ; ) = t 2 ( ; ) and t 3 ( ; ), into (7) and (8) gives the equilibrium quantities x i ( ; ), y i ( ; ) and z i ( ; ). Net imports (i.e. consumption minus production) of country 1 and country 3 are respectively given by
where C (1 3 ) (2n (1 3 ) + 1 2 ) 0. Net imports are negative (positive) in the participating countries (non-participating country) when < and is su¢ ciently small. Moreover, we have
3n (1 2 ) + 6n 2 (1 3 ) 1 3n 3n 2 n (3n + 1) (1 + 2n + (2n (1 3 ) + 1 2 ))
From (16) and (17), Lemma 2 follows.
Lemma 2: Regional trade liberalization increases production and consumption in the participating countries but decreases production in the non-participating country. Moreover, consumption in the non-participating country increases if and only if the pollution damage parameter is su¢ ciently small, i.e. < 1+3n+3n 2 3n(1 2 )+6n 2 (1 3 )
:
The changes in consumption (or sales) in the participating and non-participating countries lead to corresponding changes in the price of the polluting good, and the strength of the rent capture e¤ect, in these countries. The increase in sales in the participating countries implies a decrease in the price of the polluting good in these countries. This weakens the rent capture e¤ect in the non-participating country and tends to raise its pollution tax. If is su¢ ciently small, regional trade liberalization also increases sales and decreases price in the non-participating country. This tends to raise pollution tax in the participating countries through the rent capture e¤ect. On the other hand, if is large enough to decrease sales and increase price in the non-participating country, the rent capture e¤ect in each participating country is then subject to counteracting forces. For example, country 1's rent capture e¤ect tends to become weaker due to the fall in price in country 2 but stronger due to the rise in price in country 3.
In general, the above-speci…ed changes in consumption and production drive the changes in equilibrium pollution tax and welfare that arise due to regional trade liberalization. For expositional ease, we examine these changes for the two polar cases where pollution is purely local and perfectly transboundary.
Local pollution
This subsection examines the case of local pollution when = 0. The impact of an equal bilateral reduction in tari¤ by countries 1 and 2 on equilibrium pollution taxes is then given by
where M 3 (2n + + 2n ) (13n + 9n 2 + 3) 27n 2 (3n + 1) (2n + 1) 2 + 18n + 5, and
3n (2n + 1) (18n + 27n 2 + 2) (18n + 42n 2 + 27n 3 + 2) n ( + 1) (2n + 1) (3n + 1) (3 + 6n + 1)
Proposition 3 follows from the above.
Proposition 3: When pollution is purely local, regional trade liberalization increases equilibrium pollution tax in the participating (non-participating) country if and only if the pollution damage parameter is su¢ ciently large (small).
proof: From (18) we have that M is concave in ; M j =0 > 0, and M 0 if and only if r A 13n+9n 2 +3+ p 138n+835n 2 +2466n 3 +3537n 4 +1944n 5 +9 18n(2n+1)(3n+1)
. Moreover, from (19),
. Proposition 3 indicates that, for pollutants that have very harmful but localized impacts, regional trade liberalization is likely to strengthen environmental protection in participating countries but weaken such protection in non-participating countries.
Regional trade liberalization increases polluting production in the participating countries. Consequently, in these countries, the changing strength of the pollution shifting e¤ect tends to increase the equilibrium pollution tax, whereas the change in the tari¤ e¤ect tends to decrease it. When pollution is purely local and the pollution shifting e¤ect is at its strongest, Proposition 3 shows that the equilibrium pollution tax in the tari¤-reducing countries increases for su¢ ciently high values of . On the other hand, in the non-participating country, the tari¤ e¤ect tends to increase its pollution tax. Moreover, since regional tari¤ reduction decreases production in the nonparticipating country, the pollution shifting e¤ect operates in the opposite direction in this country. Hence, pollution tax increases in the non-participating country when is su¢ ciently small.
The equilibrium welfare of each country, denoted by W i ( ; ), can be derived by substituting the equilibrium pollution taxes t i ( ; ) into (9). The impact of regional trade liberalization on each country's welfare is derived as follows. We …rst di¤erentiate W i ( ; ) with respect to , and then evaluate the resulting expression, which is a function of both and , at = = 0. This gives the impact of marginal bilateral tari¤ reduction by countries 1 and 2 on welfare of country i, when evaluated in the neighbourhood of free trade, as follows:
From (20) and (21), we have Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: When pollution is purely local, regional trade liberalization in the neighbourhood of free trade increases (decreases) equilibrium welfare in the participating (non-participating) country.
The changes in welfare in the participating and non-participating countries follow from the changes in production and consumption in these countries brought about by regional trade liberalization. For instance, with local pollution, price of the polluting good exceeds its marginal social cost in the participating countries. Consequently, the increase in consumption and production in these countries increases their welfare.
Perfectly transboundary pollution
We now take up the case of perfectly transboundary pollution where pollution generated in each country a¤ects all three countries equally (i.e. =
3
). As a result, the pollution shifting e¤ect is absent -this approximates the situation with respect to global pollutants such as greenhouse gases. The impact of an equal bilateral reduction in tari¤ rate by countries 1 and 2 on equilibrium pollution taxes is now given by
From (22) and (23), Proposition 5 follows.
Proposition 5: When pollution is perfectly transboundary, regional trade liberalization decreases (increases) equilibrium pollution tax in the participating (non-participating) country.
When pollution is perfectly transboundary, the increased production in the participating countries does not exert an upward pressure on their pollution tax through the pollution shifting e¤ect. Instead, the reduction in decreases pollution tax in the participating countries through the tari¤ and rent capture e¤ects. Converse changes in the tari¤ and rent capture e¤ects move the pollution tax rate upwards in the nonparticipating country, as decreases.
The equilibrium welfare level in each country is derived by substituting the equilibrium pollution taxes t i ( ; ) into (9). The impact of regional trade liberalization on each country's welfare is obtained as earlier. Thus, we …rst di¤erentiate W i ( ; ) with respect to , and then evaluate the resulting expression, which is a function of both and , at = = 0. This yields:
where G 9n (2n + 1) 2 + 2 (7n + 9n 2 + 1). The following result holds. :
The above changes in welfare follow from the relevant changes in production and consumption brought about by regional trade liberalization in the participating and non-participating countries. Table 1 summarizes the results for multilateral and regional trade liberalization in the neighbourhood of free trade. The results emerge from the interaction of the rent capture, pollution shifting and tari¤ e¤ects, and changes in these e¤ects depend on the nature of the trade liberalization process. While multilateral trade liberalization increases production and consumption in all countries, regional trade liberalization reduces production in the non-participating country and may decrease its consumption as well (the latter happens when the pollution damage parameter is su¢ ciently large). The changes in consumption and production have corresponding impacts on the rent capture and pollution shifting e¤ects in these countries. Moreover, the tari¤ e¤ect reduces equilibrium pollution tax in all countries in the multilateral case, and in participating countries in the regional case, but increases the non-participating country's tax in the case of regional trade liberalization.
Comparison
A comparison of the results in Table 1 reveals that multilateral and regional trade liberalization a¤ect pollution tax and welfare in the tari¤-reducing countries in similar ways when pollution is local, but in dissimilar ways for perfectly transboundary pollution.
Multilateral trade liberalization increases pollution tax in the participating countries if and only if pollution is su¢ ciently harmful. A similar result holds for regional trade liberalization when pollution damage is localized. However, for pollutants that have large inter-jurisdictional spillovers (e.g. greenhouse gases), regional trade liberal-ization always decreases the participating countries'pollution tax. When pollution is transboundary, regional trade liberalization is thus more likely than multilateral trade liberalization to weaken environmental protection in the tari¤-reducing countries.
Moreover, when pollution is transboundary, countries undertaking multilateral trade liberalization in the neighbourhood of free trade experience a reduction in welfare. In contrast, regional trade liberalization, in the neighbourhood of free trade, may increase welfare in the participating countries. The di¤erence between multilateral and regional trade liberalization in terms of their impact on welfare of the tari¤-reducing countries suggests that multilateralism is likely to be the less preferred option for the establishment of free trade amongst countries. This is in line with the recent experience with respect to multilateral and regional trade agreements discussed in the Introduction.
Further, regional trade liberalization is found to a¤ect pollution tax and welfare in the participating and non-participating countries in very dissimilar ways. When pollution is local but su¢ ciently harmful, regional trade liberalization strengthens environmental protection in participating countries but weakens such protection in the non-participating country.
Conclusion
The paper considers trade between identical countries with imperfectly competitive markets and examines the impact of multilateral and regional tari¤ reduction on their non-cooperative equilibrium pollution tax and welfare. We …nd that when production causes pollution, and countries impose a strategic pollution tax that adjusts to changing rates of tari¤, trade liberalization may weaken environmental policy and reduce welfare in the tari¤-reducing countries.
When a pollution tax is chosen strategically by countries, it is a¤ected by the rent capture, pollution shifting and tari¤ e¤ects. Tari¤ reduction changes the magnitude of these e¤ects and is observed to a¤ect equilibrium pollution tax and welfare in ways that depend, in part, on the characteristics of the pollution itself (viz. pollution damage parameter and pollution spillover parameter).
The nature of the trade liberalization process matters as well. While the existing literature has focused on analyzing multilateral trade liberalization, much tari¤ reduction in the world is undertaken through regional trade agreements amongst a sub-group of trading countries. We …nd that multilateral and regional trade liberaliza-tion a¤ects pollution tax and welfare in the tari¤-reducing countries in similar ways for local pollution but in dissimilar ways for perfectly transboundary pollution. As well, when pollution is transboundary, regional trade liberalization is more likely than multilateral trade liberalization to weaken environmental protection in the tari¤-reducing countries.
In their analysis of trade with perfect competition and non-strategic environmental policy, Copeland and Taylor (2004, p. 29) had noted that, "If pollution externalities are fully internalized, trade must always increase welfare."However, in our model involving a ‡exible environmental tax that not only adjusts to changing openness to trade but is also strategically distorted, we …nd that the distortions can be severe enough to negate the bene…cial e¤ects of freer trade. Our welfare results thus provide formal support to what Kennedy (1994, p. 62) had speculated, "However, one can speculate that the strategic distortions associated with openness have the potential to be su¢ ciently destructive as to more than o¤set any bene…ts associated with trade liberalization."
We have examined the analytically tractable case of identical countries facing linear demand and quadratic pollution cost. Nevertheless, even when these simplifying assumptions are relaxed, production, consumption, and the various strategic e¤ects described above will continue to change di¤erently across countries, leading to di¤erential impacts of multilateral and regional trade liberalization on environmental protection and social welfare.
